Counterfeit parts are a serious problem to the DoD supply chain and to DoD maintainers. The existence of counterfeit parts in the supply chain has the potential to reduce equipment performance and reliability, and even endanger operators and maintainers. This forum will examine the impact that counterfeit parts are having on DoD sustainment operations, and address some of the technology and processes being utilized by DoD to deter and detect counterfeit parts. Presentations will include a description of the policy framework that guides our efforts to ensure a counterfeit free supply stock, and specific initiatives that DLA and the military services are employing to assess, develop, and implement technology-based capabilities designed to combat counterfeit parts.
1300-1309: Welcome and Overview – Greg Kilchenstein (OSD-MPP) Presentation
1309-1310: Administrative Notes – Debbie Lilu (NCMS)
1310-1335: OSD(Logistics) Overview on the Anti-Counterfeit Policy Framework and Collaborative Activities – (Col Copes / Scott Hawkins) Presentation
1335-1400: Defense Logistics Agency Counterfeit Program J3-4 – Art Beauchamp (DLA) Presentation Pending
1400-1425: HQ, USAF Counterfeit Parts Detection Perspective – Teresa Moyer (HQ AFMC/ENS) Presentation Pending
1425-1450: NAVSEA Anti-counterfeit Efforts – Fred Schipp / Andrew Howard (NSWC-Crane)*
*“NAVSEA Counterfeit Trends and E-Test” presentation is “Distribution Statement C: Distribution authorized for U.S. Government and their contractors”. Any U.S. Government or Support Contractor wanting a copy of the presentation, can send a request to Ray Langlais at email@example.com .
Event: On 27 August 2019, the Joint Technology Exchange Group (JTEG), in coordination with the National Center for Manufacturing Sciences (NCMS), hosted a virtual forum on “Counterfeit Parts Detection”.
Purpose: The purpose of this forum was to examine the impact that counterfeit parts are having on DoD sustainment operations, and address some of the technology and processes being utilized by DoD to deter and detect counterfeit parts. Presentations included a description of the policy framework that guides our efforts to ensure a counterfeit free supply stock, and specific initiatives that DLA and the military services are employing to assess, develop, and implement technology-based capabilities designed to combat counterfeit parts.
Welcome: Greg Kilchenstein – OSD(MPP) welcomed everyone to the forum, thanked the presenters and all the listeners for their attendance, discussed the importance of anti-counterfeit efforts in DoD sustainment, and then briefly previewed the agenda.
Administrative: This was an open forum. The presentations, along with questions and answers, were conducted through Adobe Connect. A separate audio line was used. Approximately 55 participants from across DOD and industry joined in the forum.
OSD(Logistics) Overview on the Anti-Counterfeit Policy Framework and Collaborative Activities – Scott Hawkins (OSD(L)) discussed DoD policies to include: DoDI 4140.67 – DoD Counterfeit Prevention Policy and how it describes responsibilities to prevent the introduction of counterfeits into DoD Supply Chain, and responsibilities for detection, remediation, investigation, and restitution of related to counterfeit parts. He also described current legislation such Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2339a “Enhanced Procedures for SCRM” and the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act (FASCSA), and emphasized the importance of information sharing through venues such as the Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Info Sharing Program and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP).
Defense Logistics Agency Counterfeit Program J3-4 – Art Beauchamp (DLA) talked about supply chain security strategy combating counterfeit parts and described DLA’s layered defense, which uses data analytics, business decision analytics, a risk dashboard, vendor network mapping, a digital platform pilot, and material testing capabilities. He also discussed microcircuit marking and traceability as microcircuits have a high incident rate with counterfeit electronic parts.
HQ, USAF Counterfeit Parts Detection Perspective – Teresa Moyer (HQ AFMC/ENS) discussed AFMC trusted systems and networks (TSN) information and communications technology (ICT) describing the components of key program protection activities including:
- Software Assurance
- Hardware Assurance/Trusted Foundry/Firmware
- Supply Chain Risk Management
- Joint Federated Assurance Center (JFAC)
She categorized the components and emphasized the goal is to protect these key components from malicious activity.
NAVSEA Anti-counterfeit Efforts – Fred Schipp and Andrew Howard (NSWC-Crane) discussed counterfeit trends and E-Test, staring off with a counterfeit example and a graph of the most counterfeit manufacturers. They then focused on concerns with the increasing trend of counterfeit ceramic capacitors, and described a case involving a recently indicted U.S. broker. They also described the use of temperature ranges and other tests, as well as the presence of clones and the second order effects for detection.
Q&A – A Q&A occurred after each briefer finished their presentation. Questions and answers will be posted on the JTEG website with these minutes.
Closing Comments: Greg Kilchenstein thanked the presenters for their contributions and all the work being done to support the anti-counterfeit efforts within DoD sustainment. He suggested continuing the information exchange beyond the forum and the importance of collaboration within the DoD maintenance community.
- Work to get the briefing slides cleared for “public release”, and then post them on the JTEG website at http://jteg.ncms.org/ .
Next JTEG Meeting: The next scheduled JTEG virtual forum is 24 September, 1:00 – 3:00 pm EST. The topic is “Big Data Analytics”.
POC this action is Ray Langlais, firstname.lastname@example.org , (571) 633-8019
OSD(L) – Scott Hawkins
Q1. How does OSD(L) govern or oversee DoDI 4140.67? Does your office call the Services in to provide implementation status and work remaining to manage Supply chain risk in this area?
A1. It is broad in scope. If we find issues we’ll make changes to it. No, we dot call the Services in. This is one of many issuances we are responsible for.
Q2. Does DCMA insure that our suppliers adhere to DFARS 252.246-7007?
A2. They ensure they adhere if it is in the contract they are managing. There are so many contracts that DCMA may not be working with the smaller contracts. The Services do their own contracts.
Q3. As a small business desiring to be a spare parts vendor and use additive my first priority is to be Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC). How do the emerging Anti-Counterfeit/SCRM efforts align with this NIST based standard as I am concerned about additional small business impact sand required investment?
A3. Applies not just to counterfeit, i.e. also HAZMAT packaging. I don’t really have an answer. We should do better to help them.
Q4. What is meant by “transfer supply chain risk?”
A4. Not sure there is a definition. The intent is to transfer risk to a portion that is not detrimental and put more emphasis on critical high-risk areas.
Comment: Army CRM Website URL https://ibwebportal.ria.army.mil/CPP/
DLA Counterfeit Program – Art Beauchamp
Q1. When there is a suspected counterfeit how are the services notified?
A1. Two ways. 1) Product Quality Deficiency Report (PQDR) – DLA does the quality investigation; 2) GIDEP – to federal government
Q2. Is every part checked or a sample?
A2. Only a sample for the inventory. A test is performed prior to purchase and a target sampling afterwards.
Q3. What percent of DLA inventory (electronics) actually tagged?
A3. We only tag microcircuits…about 80-85,000 items.
Q4. How well does tagging ink hold up to MIL STD testing flows from 883 etc.?
A4. It has been through 2 years of R&D and has passed all MILSTDs.
Q5. What is one major change in law that you would like to see that would significantly enchance DLA’s ability to combat the acquisition of counterfeit material?
A5. I think having something similar for mechanical and other parts.
Q6. Do you have a centralized database that captures all counterfeit material and can it be connected to the Services’ resource planning tools for automated alerts?
A6. The official system – GIDEP
AFMC TSN – Teresa Moyer
NAVSEA – Fred Shipp / Andrew Howard (NSWC Crane)
Q1. In the California case you discussed was the vendor’s intent just to sell cheap parts to maximize his profits or to purposely introduce opportunities for failure on behalf of a foreign entity?
A1. Good question. They found no evidence of malicious intent. It seemed all for profit.
Q2. Why is visual part inspection becoming more effective?
A2. We are just getting better, and checking more conditions than in the past.
Q3. Basing counterfeit detection on temperature performance range, how can you differentiate counterfeit vs poor quality control?
A3. If screening for counterfeit, a temperature failure will be across the board. It will be a wider distribution than a vendor lot.